Specification and Verification of Side-channel Security for Open-source Processors via Leakage Contracts

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ABSTRACT

Leakage contracts have recently been proposed as a new security abstraction at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level. Such contracts aim to faithfully capture the information processors may leak through side effects of their microarchitectural implementations. However, so far, we lack a verification methodology to check that a processor actually satisfies a given leakage contract.

In this paper, we address this problem by developing LeaVe, the first tool for verifying register-transfer-level (RTL) processor designs against ISA-level leakage contracts. To this end, we introduce a decoupling theorem that separates security and functional correctness concerns when verifying contract satisfaction. LeaVe leverages this decoupling to make verification of contract satisfaction practical. To scale to realistic processor designs LeaVe further employs inductive reasoning on relational abstractions. Using LeaVe, we precisely characterize the side-channel security guarantees provided by three open-source RISC-V processors, thereby obtaining the first contract satisfaction proofs for RTL processor designs.

1 INTRODUCTION

Microarchitectural attacks [12, 30, 32, 44, 47] compromise security by exploiting software-visible artifacts of microarchitectural optimizations like caches and speculative execution. To use modern hardware securely, programmers must be aware of how these optimizations impact the security of their code. Unfortunately, instruction set architectures (ISAs), the traditional abstraction layer between hardware and software, do not provide an adequate basis for secure programming: ISAs abstract away from microarchitectural details and thus fail to capture their security implications.

To build secure software systems on top of modern hardware, we need a new abstraction at the ISA level that faithfully captures the information processors may leak through side effects of their microarchitectural implementations. We refer to this new abstraction as *leakage contracts*. For example, the leakage contract underlying constant-time programming [8], used for writing cryptographic code, states that processors can leak a program's control flow and memory accesses, which therefore must not depend on secret data.

Recent work has made significant strides towards using leakage contracts as a basis for building secure systems, through their formal specification [25, 35]; through automatic security analysis

of software [15, 18, 23, 24, 45]; and through post-silicon processor fuzzing [11, 36–38]. However, leakage contracts can only unfold their full potential once hardware is available that *provably satisfies such contracts*. The proliferation of open-source processors around the RISC-V ecosystem presents an opportunity to fill this gap.

In this paper, we present the first approach for verifying register-transfer-level (RTL) processor designs against ISA-level leakage contracts. This requires overcoming the following challenges:

- Bridging the abstraction gap between sequential instructionlevel leakage contracts and cycle-level processor designs that overlap the execution of multiple instructions.
- Leakage contracts capture a processor's information leakage on top of its functional specification. Verifying contract satisfaction, thus, requires reasoning about both functional and security aspects, which goes against the separation of these two concerns.
- Even simple open-source processor designs have large and complex state spaces, which prohibit explicit enumeration or bounded model checking.

Our verification approach and its implementation LeaVe overcome these challenges based on the following contributions:

- (1) We adapt the leakage contract framework from [25] to RTL processors, capturing instruction-level contracts and realistic cyclelevel attacker models in a uniform framework.
- (2) We introduce a decoupling theorem that separates security and functional correctness aspects for contract satisfaction.
- (3) We develop a verification algorithm for checking the security aspects of contract satisfaction that employs inductive reasoning on relational abstractions to scale to realistic processor designs.
- (4) We implement and experimentally evaluate our approach on three open-source RISC-V processors.

Next, we discuss these four contributions in more detail.

Leakage contracts for RTL processors: We adapt the leakage contract framework from [25] for RTL processor designs (§3). This requires significant changes since the framework in [25] builds on top of a simple sequential operational model of an out-of-order processor rather than on cycle-level RTL circuits. In a nutshell, we model both the leakage contract and the attacker as *monitoring circuits* that output traces capturing the processor's *intended leakage*, given by the contract, and its *actual leakage*, given by the attacker. In this setting, a microarchitecture *satisfies a contract* for a given attacker if the following holds: whenever two architectural states

lead to executions that are distinguishable by the attacker circuit applied to the microarchitecture, then the two states should also lead to executions that are distinguishable by the contract circuit applied to the reference architectural model.

Decoupling security and functional correctness: We introduce a decoupling theorem (§4.1) that separates security and functional correctness concerns for contract satisfaction. For this, we introduce the notion of *microarchitectural contract satisfaction* that refers only to the microarchitecture and ensures the absence of leaks. The decoupling theorem states that, for processors correctly implementing the reference model, contract satisfaction and microarchitectural contract satisfaction are equivalent. This allows us to focus *only* on the security challenges arising from leakage verification, while relying on existing approaches for functional correctness [13, 26, 28, 31, 39, 42, 48].

Verifying contract satisfaction: We develop a novel algorithm for checking microarchitectural contract satisfaction (§4.2), which we prove correct. That is, whenever our algorithm indicates that a contract is satisfied then microarchitectural satisfaction indeed holds. Given a contract monitoring circuit and a microarchitecture, our approach inductively learns invariants associated with pairs of microarchitectural executions with the same contract traces using invariant learning techniques [20] and uses these invariants to establish contract satisfaction.

Implementation and evaluation: We implement our approach in LeaVe, a tool for verifying microarchitectural contract satisfaction for processors design in Verilog (§5). We validate our approach by precisely characterizing the side-channel security guarantees of three open-source RISC-V processors in multiple configurations (§6). For this, we define a family of leakage contracts capturing leaks through control flow, memory accesses, and variable-time instructions, and use LeaVe to determine which contracts each processor satisfies against an attacker observing when instructions retire. Our evaluation confirms that LeaVe can be used to effectively verify side-channel security guarantees provided by open-source processors in less than 3 hours for our most complex targets. Our experiments also show that checking microarchitectural contract satisfaction (as enabled by our decoupling theorem) rather than on top of an architectural reference model significantly speeds up verification (less than 2 hours versus 33 hours for a simple 2-stage processor), allowing us to scale verification to realistic processors.

2 OVERVIEW

Here, we illustrate the key points of our approach with an example. We start by presenting a simple instruction set and the processor implementing it (§2.1). Next, we show how microarchitectural leaks can be formalized using leakage contracts (§2.2). Finally, we illustrate how the Leave verification tool verifies that the contract is satisfied, thereby ensuring the absence of unwanted leaks (§2.3).

2.1 A simple processor

Next, we present the instruction set and processor implementation.

Instruction set. We consider an instruction set supporting addition and multiplication of immediates to a single register. Instructions consist of the instruction type (ADD or MUL) and an immediate value

```
module R(input clk, output register);
        reg [31:0] imem [31:0], pc, register;
        wire [31:0] instr = imem[pc];
        assign op = instr[7:0]:
        assign imm = instr[31:8];
        always @(posedge clk) begin
           pc <= pc + 1;
        end
11
12
        always @ (posedge clk) begin
13
14
            case(op)
15
            `ADD : register <= register + imm;
            `MUL : register <= register * imm;
16
            `CLR : register <= 0;
```

Figure 1: Reference model for our running example.

```
module P(input clk, output ready, register);
        reg [31:0] imem [31:0], pcF, register;
        // Decode
        wire [31:0] instr = imem[pcF];
        always @(posedge clk) begin
            ex_{op} \le inst[7:0];
            ex_imm <= inst[31:8];
10
11
        always @(posedge clk) begin
         if (ready) pcF <= pcF + 1;</pre>
13
14
15
        assign pc = pcF-2; // Architectural pc
16
17
        // Execute
18
        assign ready = (!mult);
        assign rd = we ? wb_res : register;// Forwarding
20
21
22
        log_time_mult(mult, m_imm, m_rd, m_res, done);
23
        always @ (posedge clk) begin
24
          if (ready)
25
26
            case(ex_op)
               `ADD : wb_res <= rd + ex_imm;
27
                      we <= 1: mult <= 0:
28
              `MUL : mult <= 1; we <= 0;
30
                      m_rd <= rd; m_imm <= ex_imm;</pre>
              `CLR : we <= 1; mult <= 0; wb_res <= 0;
31
32
          if (done)
            mult <= 0; wb_res <= m_res; we <= 1;
33
34
35
        // Write back
36
        always @ (posedge clk) begin
          if (we) // write enabled
38
            register <= wb_res; retired <= 1;</pre>
40
          else
41
            retired <= 0;
```

Figure 2: A simple processor that performs addition and multiplications. The multiplication module log_time_mul leaks part of both register value and immediate operand via timing.




Figure 4: Traces that do not leak via timing.

(constant) imm. An ADD instruction adds the immediate to the register value, whereas a MUL instruction multiplies the register value by the immediate. Finally, a CLR instruction resets the register to zero.

Figure 1 depicts a Verilog reference model for our instruction set that executes one instruction per cycle. Instructions are stored in instruction memory imem. Lines 6 and 7 decode the instruction into operator (ADD, MUL, or CLR) and operand (immediate value). Lines 13 to 18 case-split on the type of operation and update the register with the new value. Finally, Line 10 advances the program counter.

Pipelined implementation. Figure 2 shows an implementation of the instruction set that processes instructions in a three-stage pipeline. If the pipeline is not stalled (flag ready), the processor starts by fetching a new instruction in line 13. As in Figure 1, the decode stage (lines 7 to 10) decodes a new instruction into operator and immediate. Next, the execute stage executes the decoded instruction (lines 24 to 34). The write-back stage updates the register with the result of the computation (lines 37 to 42). This step is controlled by the write-enabled flag we. Finally, the processor performs forwarding from the execute to the write-back stage (line 20).

Both ADD (line 27) and CLR (line 31) instructions are executed in a single cycle and their results are passed to the write-back stage.

In contrast, MUL instructions (line 29 to line 34) may take multiple cycles. Multiplication starts in line 29 by setting register mult to 1. This indicates that the processor cannot fetch new instructions (line 19) and must stall the pipeline (line 13). The processor then multiplies immediate and register value. This step is implemented in module log_time_mult (line 22), which we omit. The module takes time proportional to the logarithm of m_rd's value, i.e., the register value, to perform the multiplication. It also has a fast path that completes the multiplication in a single cycle whenever operand or register are 0 or 1. Once multiplication terminates, mul_res contains the multiplication result and the processor stops stalling the pipeline by setting mult to 0 (line 33) and passes the result to the write-back stage.

2.2 Specifying side-channel leakage

We now illustrate how to use leakage contracts to capture sidechannel security guarantees for our example processor.

Leakage. To use the processor from Figure 2 securely, we need to know what the processor may leak to an attacker. In the following, we consider an attacker that observes the value of the output-ready flag ready at each cycle, i.e., it observes the pipeline's timing.

Assume that initially the register has value 0. Figure 3 shows pairs of instruction sequences that an attacker can distinguish. The sequences in Figure 3a are distinguishable since the upper trace performs a multiplication while the lower trace does not, resulting in a timing difference. Similarly, the attacker can distinguish the traces in Figure 3b, as the upper trace profits from the fast path in the multiplier, while the lower trace does not. Even though the immediate operands to MUL are the same in Figure 3c, the attacker can tell the sequences apart, as the register values are different.

In contrast, Figure 4 shows pairs of instruction sequences that are indistinguishable for our attacker. Figure 4a does not leak as it does not perform multiplication. Figure 4b initially performs additions with different values, but resets the register state via CLR before MUL. Finally, Figure 4c performs additions with different values that result in the same register state before MUL.

Capturing leakage via monitors. To use the processor securely, we need to distinguish program behaviors that leak from those that do not. For this, we compose the reference model R (Figure 1), which captures the functional behavior of the ISA, with a leakage monitor L shown below. The leakage monitor captures which information may be leaked upon executing instructions. The monitor takes as input a module M representing the underlying circuit. We denote by L[M] the composition of L and M such that the composition hides M's outputs, and L can refer to M's internal variables (§3.3).

In our example, the monitor leaks whether the operation that is performed is a multiplication or not (ismul). Whenever a MUL is executed, the monitor additionally leaks the register value (r) and whether the immediate is 0 or 1 (isFP), thereby capturing the leaks associated with the multiplier's fast path.

```
monitor L(module M, output leak)
assign inst = M.imem[M.pc];
assign r = M.register;
assign op = inst[7:0];
assign imm = inst[31:8];
assign isFP = (imm==0 || imm==1);
assign ismul = (op=="MUL);

always @( * ) begin
if (ismul)
leak = {r, isFP, ismul};
else
leak = {0, 0, ismul};
end
```

Note that $\{a, b, c\}$ is Verilog notation for the concatenation of signals a, b, and c. Consider the leakage observations (i.e., the values for leak) produced by L[R], i.e., the leakage monitor applied to the reference model. All pairs of sequences in Figure 4 produce the same observations, whereas all pairs in Figure 3 result in different observation traces. For example, in Figure 4a, L[R] produces observations consisting of $\{0,0,0\}$ for both instruction sequences. In contrast,

¹This timing profile is similar to the Slow Multi-Cycle Multiplier from [3].




Figure 5: ISA compliance, contract satisfaction, and microarchitectural contract satisfaction.

for the second instruction of Figure 3a, the upper sequence produces observation {2,0,1} but the lower one produces {0,0,0}.

Attacker observations. Next, we define the observations an attacker can make about implementation P. Since we consider an attacker that can observe the timing of the computation, we define another monitor A that simply exposes the ready bit.

```
monitor A(module M, output leak)
always @ ( * ) begin
leak = M.ready;
and
```

The composition of attacker and implementation A[P] defines the *actual information* an attacker may learn about the implementation.

Leakage contracts. The composition L[R] of leakage monitor and reference model defines a leakage contract at the ISA level. The contract characterizes leaks at the granularity of the execution of instructions from the instruction set, and it expresses which parts of the computation may be leaked by the hardware. For programmers, the contract provides a guideline for writing side-channel free code: secrets should never influence leakage observations. In our example, any two program executions that differ only in their secrets (e.g., the initial register value) must produce indistinguishable traces.

Contract satisfaction. The implementation P satisfies the contract L[R] under the attacker A whenever P leaks no more than specified by the contract under A. That is, circuit A[P] should leak no more than circuit L[R], denoted $L[R] \supseteq A[P]$. That is, for any pair of initial architectural states for which L[R] produces the same leakage observations, A[P] must produce the same attacker observations. A formal definition of this relation is provided in §3.3. For example, for all pairs of instruction sequences shown in Figure 4, A[P] must produce the same sequence of ready bits. In contrast, for the pairs of sequences in Figure 3, the sequence of ready bits may differ, but it does not have to. Next, we describe our methodology to check that an implementation satisfies a contract.

2.3 Verifying contract satisfaction

Formally verifying contract satisfaction amounts to proving that $L[R] \supseteq A[P]$ holds. This requires reasoning about pairs of infinite traces from L[R] and A[P] for *all* possible initial memories, *all* possible initial microarchitectural states, and *all* possible programs run on the processor. Beyond reasoning about security, this also implicitly requires to show that P correctly implements the ISA. In our example, functional correctness bugs in P would often also result in contract violations as leakage observations are a function

of the architectural state. For instance, assume an incorrectly implemented CLR instructions that does not reset the register to 0. Then the traces in Figure 4b would likely be distinguishable via timing.

While functional correctness is thus crucial for security, it needs to be verified independently of security concerns. Indeed, there are many existing approaches [13, 26, 28, 31, 39, 42, 48] for checking ISA compliance. One of the contributions of this paper is to show how leakage and functional verification can be decoupled from each other, enabling a clean separation of functional and security concerns

ISA compliance. So what does it mean for the implementation to comply with the ISA? Intuitively, the implementation should go through the same sequence of architectural states as the reference model. However, the reference model processes one instruction in each cycle, while the implementation overlaps the execution of multiple instructions and may or may not retire an instruction in any given cycle. To bridge this gap, a retirement predicate captures when the processor retires instructions and thus commits changes to the architectural state. A retirement predicate ϕ over implementation circuit P must satisfy the following constraint: whenever ϕ holds, P's current architectural state corresponds to a valid architectural state of the reference implementation, and no changes to the architectural state may occur when ϕ does not hold. For our example, the architectural variables are pc, imem, and register and $\phi \triangleq (retired = 1)$ is a valid retirement predicate. In fact, ϕ acts as a witness to the fact that P complies with the ISA defined by the reference model R: For any initial architectural state, R transitions through the same sequence of architectural states as P does upon instruction retirement, i.e., whenever ϕ holds. We denote this notion of ISA compliance by $P \equiv_{\phi} R$.

Decoupling leakage and functional correctness. Using the retirement predicate, we are able to decouple leakage from functional verification. To this end, we first define a *filtered semantics* (in §3) that only considers states in which ϕ holds. Since $P \equiv_{\phi} R$ implies that P's architectural state matches R's whenever ϕ holds, the sequence of architectural states produced by the filtered semantics of P with respect to ϕ is equal to the sequence of states produced by R, assuming the processor is implemented correctly.

Based on the filtered semantics, we can define the notion of *microarchitectural contract satisfaction*: To this end, we apply the leakage monitor L directly to P and then relate L[P] to A[P], bypassing the reference model: For all pairs of traces of L[P], if contract observations (filtered using ϕ) are the same, then A[P]'s observations must also be the same. We denote this relation by L \geq_{P}^{ϕ} A.

Our main theorem, Theorem 1 (in §4.1), states that if P correctly implements R with respect to retirement predicate ϕ , then $L \geq_{\mathsf{P}}^{\phi}$ A *if and only if* L[R] \supseteq A[P]. This means that we can analyze contract satisfaction purely based on the implementation P. Figure 5 illustrates the main concepts and their relation.

Verification via inductive invariants. Leave, our verification approach, verifies $L \geq_{\mathsf{P}}^{\phi} A$ by approximating it via the following safety property: Any two prefixes of traces that agree on their leakage observations also agree on attacker observations *and* determine each instruction's retirement time. A challenge in this formulation is that differences in attacker observations may surface

before the corresponding differences in leakage observations due to pipelined execution and the fact that leakage observations corresponding to an instruction can only be evaluated upon instruction retirement. We address this challenge by applying a bounded lookahead to the leakage observations.

Checking this safety property requires appropriate inductive invariants, which would be tedious to come up with manually, in particular for complex designs. Thus, we synthesize appropriate invariants from a pool of candidate relational invariants following the classic Houdini algorithm [20].

3 FORMAL MODEL

In this section, we present the key components of our formal model. We start by introducing $\mu V LoG$, a simple hardware description language (§3.1). Next, we show how to formalize instruction-set architectures and microarchitectures in $\mu V LoG$ (§3.2). We conclude by formalizing leakage contracts (§3.3).

3.1 μVLog: A Hardware Description Language

 μ VLOG is a language for specifying synchronous sequential circuits. It captures the key features of hardware description languages like Verilog and VHDL, and we use it as the core language for LeaVe.

Syntax. The syntax of μ VLOG is given in Figure 6. Expressions e are built from values $Vals = \mathbb{N} \cup \{\bot\}$, which are natural numbers or the designated value \bot , registers Regs, which store values, and variables Vars, which are shorthands for more complex expressions. Expressions can be combined using unary operators Θe , binary operators $e_1 \otimes e_2$, if-then-else operators if e_1 th e_2 el e_3 , and bit-selection operators $e_1[e_2:e_3]$. An assignment $r \leftarrow e$ sets the next value of register x to the value of expression e in the current cycle. A wire w = e always has the value of expression e. Finally, a circuit e consists of a set of assignments e0, a set of wires e1, and a set of outputs e2 e3 of e4.

Given a circuit C, we refer to its assignments as C.A, to its wires as C.W, and to its outputs as C.O. The set read(C) of read registers consists of all registers x that occur in at least one right-hand side of an assignment in C.A or wire in C.W. Similarly, the set write(C) of write registers consists of all registers in left-hand sides of assignments in C.A. We assume that (1) $C.O \subseteq vars(C)$, where $vars(C) = read(C) \cup write(C)$, and (2) each register and variable is on the left-hand side of at most one assignment or wire.

Example 1. Consider the circuit sISA given below. The circuit implements a simple ISA, in which instructions consist solely of immediate values m[pc] that are retrieved from memory m and added to the single internal register $reg.^2$

$$sISA = \{pc \leftarrow pc + 1, reg \leftarrow reg + m[pc]\} : \{reg\}$$

We have $vars(sISA) = read(sISA) = \{pc, reg, m\}$ and $write(sISA) = \{pc, reg\}$, and the single output reg; the circuit satisfies our assumptions.

Semantics. We formalize the semantics of μ VLog circuits by specifying how their state is updated at each cycle. We model the state

```
Basic Types
(Registers)
                             \in
                                   Regs
(Variables)
                             \in
                                   Vars
(Identifiers)
                             \in
                                   Regs \cup Vars
(Values)
                                   Vals = \mathbb{N} \cup \{\bot\}
Syntax
(Expressions)
                                   n \mid i \mid \ominus e \mid e_1 \otimes e_2
                                   | \text{ if } e_1 \text{ th } e_2 \text{ el } e_3 | e_1[e_2:e_3]
(Wires)
                      W
                                   \{w_1,\ldots,w_k\}
(Assignments)
                      а
                                  r \leftarrow e
                      Α
                            :=
                                   \{a_1,\ldots,a_n\}
(Outputs)
                      0
                            :=
                                  \{i_1,\ldots,i_m\}
                      C
                                  A:W:O
(Circuits)
                    Figure 6: µVLog syntax
```

of a circuit as a *valuation* μ that maps registers in *Regs* to values in *Vals*, i.e., $\mu : Regs \rightarrow Vals$. Given a circuit C, states(C) denotes the set of all possible valuations over vars(C). Finally, given two valuations μ, μ' and a set of registers and variables V, $\mu \sim_V \mu'$ denotes that μ and μ' agree on the values of all registers and variables in V.

The semantics $\llbracket C \rrbracket$ of a circuit C takes as input a valuation μ and outputs the valuation μ' at the next cycle. The infinite trace semantics $\llbracket C \rrbracket^\infty$ of a circuit C maps each valuation μ to the infinite sequence of valuations for C's outputs, where the i-th valuation corresponds to the circuit's output after i cycles. Additionally, the filtered infinite trace semantics $\llbracket C \rrbracket^\infty | \phi$ outputs only the valuations in $\llbracket C \rrbracket | \phi$ that satisfy a given predicate ϕ (other valuations are dropped). We formalize all these semantics in Appendix A.

Example 2. Consider again circuit *sISA* from example 1. Let us pick an initial valuation μ , such that $\mu(pc) = 0$, $\mu(reg) = 0$, and

$$\mu(m)(i) = i$$
 for $0 \le i \le 10$
 $\mu(m)(i) = 0$ otherwise.

Executing a single step gives us $\mu' = [sISA](\mu)$, with $\mu'(pc) = 1$, and $\mu'(reg) = 0$. Since only the program counter changed, we get $\mu \sim_{\{reg,mem\}} \mu'$, but not $\mu \sim_{\{pc\}} \mu'$. The trace $[sISA](\mu)$ consists of the following sequence of register values (since the register value doesn't change after step 11), where \cdot denotes concatenation:

$$[sISA](\mu) = 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 3 \cdot 6 \cdot 10 \cdot 15 \cdot 21 \cdot 28 \cdot 36 \cdot 45 \cdot 55 \cdot 55 \cdot 55 \dots$$

Finally, filtering only valuations with even program counters, using predicate $\phi = pc \mod 2 = 0$ yields the following sequence.

$$[sISA] | \phi(\mu) = 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 6 \cdot 15 \cdot 28 \cdot 45 \cdot 55 \cdot \dots$$

3.2 Modeling architectures and microarchitectures

We now show how instruction-set architectures (short: architectures) and microarchitectures can be modeled in μ VLoG. Then, we formalize what it means for a microarchitecture *IMPL* to correctly implement an architecture *ISA*.

Architectures. We view architectures as state machines that define how the execution progresses through a sequence of architectural states, where each transition corresponds to the execution of a single instruction. Given a set of *architectural registers ARCH*, we model an *architecture* as a circuit *ISA* over *ARCH*, i.e.,

 $^{^2}$ For simplicity, in the examples we treat memories as addressable arrays. For instance, like in Verilog m[pc] denotes the value in m at position pc. While this can be desugared in the syntax from Figure 6, we decided against to simplify our encodings.

vars(ISA) = ARCH. We assume that a subset init(ISA) of ISA's states are identified as initial states.

Example 3. Consider again circuit sISA from Example 1. Its variables $vars(sISA) = \{pc, reg, m\}$ form the architectural state of the ISA. We identify as initial states all valuations μ such that $\mu(pc) = 0$ and $\mu(reg) = 0$. In the circuit from Figure 1 the architectural state is given by $vars(R) = \{imem, pc, register\}$ whereas instr, op, and imm are not listed as they are wires.

Microarchitectures. We model microarchitectures as circuits that capture the execution at the granularity of clock cycles. Thus, a *microarchitecture* is a circuit *IMPL* that refers to both architectural registers in *ARCH* and to additional microarchitectural registers $\mu ARCH$ such that $vars(IMPL) = ARCH \cup \mu ARCH$ and $ARCH \cap \mu ARCH = \emptyset$. We assume that a subset init(IMPL) of IMPL's states is identified as the initial states and require that $\mu \upharpoonright_{ARCH} \in init(ISA)$ for any state $\mu \in init(IMPL)$, i.e., the architectural part of an initial microarchitectural state should be an initial architectural state.

Example 4. Let us look at a microarchitectural implementation sIMP of the ISA in example 1. The implementation, shown below, can be in one of two states (indicated by the register st): execute state (st = 0) or write-back state (st = 1). In execute state, sIMP computes the result of adding the immediate to the current register value and assigns it to variable res; it then moves to the write-back state (line 3). In write-back state, sIMP writes the result to the register reg, moves the state to execute stage, and increments the program counter (line 4). If the immediate value is zero, the implementation triggers a fast-path which keeps the circuit in execute state, increments the program counter, and leaves the register unchanged (line 2). Finally, the circuit updates variable ret which indicates whether the circuit retired in the current step. For readability, we write the example in an extended syntax that allows branches at the assignment level.³

```
1 if st = 0 then

2 if m[pc] = 0 th \{st \leftarrow 0, pc \leftarrow pc + 1, ret \leftarrow 1\}

3 el \{st \leftarrow 1, res \leftarrow m[pc] + reg, ret \leftarrow 0\}

4 el \{st \leftarrow 0, reg \leftarrow res, pc \leftarrow pc + 1, ret \leftarrow 1\} : \{reg\}
```

In addition to architectural variables $\{pc, reg, m\}$, the implementation contains microarchitectural variables $\{st, res, ret\}$. We pick as our initial valuations all μ such that $\mu(pc) = 0$, $\mu(reg) = 0$, $\mu(st) = 0$, and $\mu(ret) = 1$. As required, the initial state for architectural variables $\{pc, reg, m\}$ agrees with the state from Example 3.

ISA compliance. To correctly implement an architecture *ISA*, an implementation *IMPL* needs to change the architectural state in a manner consistent with *ISA*. We capture this with the help of a *retirement predicate* ϕ , a predicate indicating when *IMPL* retire instructions. Then, we say that a microarchitecture *IMPL* implements an architecture *ISA* (Definition 1) if one can map changes of the architectural state in *IMPL* to *ISA*'s executions using ϕ .

Definition 1. A microarchitecture *IMPL correctly implements* an architecture *ISA* given a retirement predicate ϕ over vars(IMPL),

written $IMPL \equiv_{\phi} ISA$, if for all valuations $\mu \in init(IMPL)$: (1) (Witnessed architectural changes agree with ISA) $\llbracket IMPL \rrbracket | \phi(\mu) \sim_{ARCH} \llbracket ISA \rrbracket (\mu)$, and (2) (No architectural changes beyond those witnessed) $\llbracket IMPL \rrbracket (\mu, i) \sim_{ARCH} \llbracket IMPL \rrbracket (\mu, i-1)$ whenever $\llbracket IMPL \rrbracket (\mu, i) \not\models \phi$.

The predicate ϕ characterizes when instructions are retired, i.e., when instructions modify the architectural state. Definition 1 uses ϕ to map architectural changes made by IMPL to single steps in ISA 's executions. This is sufficient for single-issue processors, which retire at most one instruction per cycle. Multiple-issue processors, which may retire multiple instructions in a single cycle, require more complex ways of mapping architectural changes made by IMPL to ISA 's steps. To simplify our model, we decided against more complex ISA compliance criteria since Leave's verification approach (§4) is decoupled from ISA compliance.

Example 5. Let's again consider implementation circuit sIMP from example 4. We choose as retirement predicate $\phi \triangleq ret = 1$. Let's consider again valuation μ from example 2, which maps pc = 0, and $\mu(m)(i) = i$, for $0 \le i \le 10$. Running sIMP on μ from produces the following sequence of register values, where we underline a register value whenever ϕ holds on the corresponding state.

$$[sIMP](\mu) = \underline{0} \cdot \underline{0} \cdot 0 \cdot \underline{1} \cdot 1 \cdot \underline{3} \cdot 3 \cdot \underline{6} \cdot 6 \cdot \underline{10} \cdot 10 \cdot \underline{15} \cdot 15 \cdot \dots$$

It's easy to check that $[sIMP]|\phi(\mu)$, *i.e.*, the sequence of underlined values, matches $[sISA](\mu)$, and that the register value remains unchanged whenever ϕ doesn't hold. Since this is true, not only for μ but for all valid initial states, we can conclude that sIMP correctly implements sISA, *i.e.*, $sIMP \equiv_{\phi} sISA$.

3.3 Leakage contracts

In this section, we first introduce monitoring circuits, which we use to specify leakage contracts and attackers. Then, we formalize contract satisfaction [25] within our modeling framework.

Monitoring circuits. Monitoring circuits only *monitor* the behavior of another circuit, and we will use them to formalize leakage contracts and attackers. We say that circuit M is a *monitoring circuit* for circuit C if (a) $write(C) \cap write(M) = \emptyset$, i.e., the two circuits write to separate sets of registers, and (b) $vars(C) \cap write(M) = \emptyset$, i.e., M does not influence C's behavior. Additionally, M is *combinatorial* whenever $read(M) \subseteq vars(C)$, i.e., M only reads from C variables and thus does not have state of its own. Finally, the *composition* of the monitoring circuit M and the monitored circuit C, denoted by M[C], is the circuit defined as $C.A \cup M.A : M.O$, which computes over C's state without changing its behavior.

Leakage contracts. A leakage contract is the composition of a leakage monitor LM, i.e., a combinatorial monitoring circuit LM for the architecture ISA, with the architecture ISA itself. That is, a leakage contract LM[ISA] discloses parts of the architectural state during ISA's execution at the granularity of instruction execution.

Hardware attackers. We formalize an *attacker* as a combinatorial monitoring circuit *ATK* for the microarchitecture *IMPL*. That is, an attacker observes parts of the microarchitecture's state during the execution at the granularity of clock cycles.

Example 6. Consider again circuit sISA from Example 1, the ISA specification of our running example. We define leakage monitor sLM, which leaks whether the current instruction is zero. As

³This syntax can be easily expanded into the one in Figure 6 by pushing branches into expressions. For example, we can rewrite if e th $\{x \leftarrow a\}$ el $\{x \leftarrow b\}$ as $x \leftarrow$ if e th a el b.

Figure 7: Two pairs of instruction traces.

sLM only reads sISA's variables, it is combinatorial.

$$sLM = \{\} : \{m[pc] = 0\}$$

Consider again valuation μ from example 2, which maps $\mu(m)(i) = i$, for $0 \le i \le 10$. As, for $i \le 10$, only the first instruction is zero, executing sLM[I] yields the following sequence.

$$[sLM[sISA]](\mu) = 1 \cdot 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 0 \cdot \dots$$

Example 7. Next, consider the implementation circuit *sIMP* from Example 4. We define the following attacker monitor, which leaks the program counter and thus the timing of the computation.

$$sAT = \{\} : \{pc\}$$

Running sAT[sIMP] on μ yields the following sequence.

$$[sAT[sIMP]](\mu) = 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots$$

Contract satisfaction. Definition 2 formalizes the notion of contract satisfaction [25]. Intuitively, a microarchitecture *IMPL* satisfies the contract LM[ISA] for an attacker ATK if ATK cannot learn more information about the initial architectural state by monitoring IMPL's executions than what is exposed by LM[ISA]. That is, for any two initial states that agree on their microarchitectural part⁴, whenever LM[ISA] results in identical traces, then ATK[IMPL] also results in identical traces (i.e., ATK cannot distinguish the two initial architectural states).

Definition 2. Microarchitecture *IMPL satisfies* contract LM[ISA] for attacker ATK, written $LM[ISA] \supseteq ATK[IMPL]$, if for all valuations $\mu, \mu' \in init(IMPL)$ such that $\mu \sim_{\mu ARCH} \mu'$, if $\llbracket LM[ISA] \rrbracket(\mu) = \llbracket LM[ISA] \rrbracket(\mu')$, then $\llbracket ATK[IMPL] \rrbracket(\mu) = \llbracket ATK[IMPL] \rrbracket(\mu')$.

We remark that Definition 2 is a 4-hyperproperty [16], i.e., it is a property that refers to 4 different traces: two contract traces from LM[ISA] and two attacker traces from ATK[IMPL].

Example 8. Let's consider the two pairs of memories (a) and (b) shown in Figure 7. We will check contract satisfaction, *i.e.*, that $sLM[sISA] \supseteq sAT[sIMP]$ on these particular traces.

Let us start with the instructions from Figure 7a. Consider two states μ_a and μ_a' , such that $\mu_a(m)$ contains the upper instructions in Figure 7, and $\mu_a'(m)$ contains the lower ones. For $i \geq 3$, we let $\mu_a(m) = \mu_a'(m) = 0$. Running μ_a and μ_a' on the contract, we get:

$$[sLM[sISA]](\mu_a) = 0 \cdot \underline{1} \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot \dots$$
$$[sLM[sISA]](\mu'_a) = 0 \cdot \underline{0} \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot \dots$$

As the contract traces differ in the second position, contract satisfaction holds trivially. Next, consider the traces in Figure 7b. As before, we construct valuations μ_b for the upper trace, and μ_b' for the lower trace. We get the traces below.

$$[sLM[sISA]](\mu_b) = [sLM[sISA]](\mu_b') = 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \cdot \dots$$

As both valuations produce the same trace, we need to check the attacker observations on the implementation. We get

$$[sAT[sIMP]](\mu_b) = [sAT[sIMP]](\mu'_b) = 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 5 \cdot \dots$$

We can therefore conclude that contract satisfaction holds for these traces. To verify contract satisfaction, we need to not only check this property for μ_b and μ_b' , but for any pair of traces. We will discuss our approach for this in the next section.

4 VERIFYING CONTRACT SATISFACTION

Here, we present our verification approach for checking contract satisfaction. First, we introduce a decoupling theorem that allows us to separate security and functional correctness proofs (§4.1). Next, we present (and prove correct) an algorithm for verifying microarchitectural contract satisfaction (§4.2). All proofs are in Appendix C.

4.1 Decoupling contract satisfaction from ISA

Since a leakage contract LM[ISA] is defined on top of ISA, proving contract satisfaction according to Definition 2 requires reasoning about security and functional compliance with respect to ISA (since one needs to map contract traces from LM[ISA] to implementation traces). We address this limitation by decoupling reasoning about security and about ISA compliance. For this, we start by introducing a leakage ordering between monitors for a circuit, which captures the "relative information" disclosed by a monitor relative to another.

Leakage ordering. We now define a leakage ordering between combinatorial monitoring circuits for an underlying circuit C. Intuitively, a monitor M for C "leaks less" (i.e., exposes less information) than another monitor M' for C if whenever M'[C] produces equivalent traces on two initial states, then M[C] also produces equivalent traces. Definition 3 formalizes this concept and extends it to support the filtered semantics.

Definition 3. Monitor M' leaks at most as much information as monitor M about circuit C, given registers $V \subseteq vars(C)$, and predicate ϕ (over C), written $M \succeq_C^{V,\phi} M'$, if for all valuations $\mu, \mu' \in init(C)$ such that $\mu \sim_V \mu'$, if $[M[C]] | \phi(\mu) = [M[C]] | \phi(\mu')$, then $[M'[C]] (\mu) = [M'[C]] (\mu')$.

Differently from Definition 2, Definition 3 is a 2-hyperproperty since it can be defined in terms of two executions of *C*.

Example 9. We can use our new definition to express contract satisfaction over the implementation only, using predicate ϕ . Consider again the two pairs of traces in Figure 7 from Example 8. If we assume that the implementation is functionally correct, that is, it satisfies Definition 1, we can replace specification sISA by implementation sIMP. In particular, since Definition 1 ensures that sISA's architectural values match sIMP's whenever witness $\phi = (ret = 1)$ holds, we can check contract satisfaction by checking $sLM \geq \frac{\{st, res, ret\}, \phi}{sIMP}$ sAT. We call this condition microarchitectural contract satisfaction. Let us now check this property for the traces in Figure 7b. Running sLM[sIMP], we get the following, where we underline outputs whenever ϕ holds.

$$[sLM[sIMP]](\mu_b) = [sLM[sIMP]](\mu_b') = \underline{0} \cdot 0 \cdot \underline{1} \cdot \underline{0} \cdot 0 \cdot \underline{1} \cdot \underline{1} \cdot \dots$$

⁴Following [25], we assume that secrets initially reside only in the architectural state and that attackers can observe the initial values of registers in $\mu ARCH$, i.e., $\mu \sim_{\mu ARCH} \mu'$.

This means the premise of the implication is satisfied, and we need to check the conclusion. As before, we get

$$[sAT[sIMP]](\mu_b) = [sAT[sIMP]](\mu'_b) = 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 5 \cdot \dots$$

which establishes $sLM \succeq_{sIMP}^{\{st,res,ret\},\phi} sAT$ for μ_b and μ_b' . We formalize this idea in Theorem 1.

Decoupling theorem. Theorem 1 states that, for functionally correct processors, *microarchitectural contract satisfaction* (i.e., $LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH,\phi} ATK$, which only refers to the microarchitecture IMPL), is equivalent to contract satisfaction (Definition 2 which refers to architecture ISA and microarchitecture IMPL). This allows us to cleanly separate reasoning about security and about functional correctness (without losing precision). In particular, we can split proving contract satisfaction into proving microarchitectural contract satisfaction (which ensures the absence of leaks with respect to IMPL) and ISA compliance. LeaVe leverages Theorem 1 to only reason about security, whereas ISA compliance can be verified separately using techniques focusing on functional correctness [42].

Theorem 1 (Decoupling Theorem). If $IMPL \equiv_{\phi} ISA$ holds for retirement predicate ϕ , then

$$LM \succeq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK \Leftrightarrow LM[ISA] \supseteq ATK[IMPL].$$

4.2 Verifying microarchitectural contract satisfaction

In this section, we present an algorithm for checking microarchitectural contract satisfaction, i.e., $LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH,\phi} ATK$. We first introduce notation for formalizing our verification queries in terms of temporal logic formulas. Next, we present the verification algorithm and conclude by proving its soundness.

Notation. To formalize our verification queries, we use a linear temporal logic over μ VLOG circuits. Formulas Φ in this logic are constructed by combining μ VLOG predicates ϕ with temporal operators \circ (denoting "in the next cycle"), \square^B (denoting "for the next B cycles"), and \square (denoting "always in the future"), and the usual boolean operators. Given a temporal formula Φ over a circuit C, we write $C, \mu, i \models \Phi$ to denote that the formula is satisfied for initial state μ at step i. We write $C, \mu \models \Phi$ to mean $C, \mu, 0 \models \Phi$, and $C \models \Phi$ to mean that $C, \mu \models \Phi$ holds for all μ . Our temporal logic is standard; we provide its formalization in Appendix B.

Example 10. Consider again circuit *sISA* from Example 1. Using initial valuation μ , where $\mu(pc) = 0$, the following holds.

$$sISA, \mu \models pc = 0$$
 $sISA, \mu \models \circ (pc = 1)$
 $sISA, \mu \models \Box^{3}(pc \le 3)$ $sISA \models pc \ge 0 \rightarrow \Box(pc \ge 0)$

Product circuit. Verifying microarchitectural contract satisfaction requires us to reason about *pairs of executions* of *IMPL*, *i.e.*, it is a 2-hyperproperty. We transform hyperproperties into properties over a single execution using a construction called *self-composition* [9]. For this, we construct a *product circuit* that executes two copies of a circuit C (C^1 and C^2) in parallel. Given circuit $C = \{x_1 \leftarrow e_1, \ldots, x_n \leftarrow e_n\} : o_1, \ldots, o_m$, we define its *product circuit* $C \times C$ as $\{x_1^1 \leftarrow e_1^1, \ldots, x_n^1 \leftarrow e_n^1, x_1^2 \leftarrow e_1^2, \ldots, x_n^2 \leftarrow e_n^2\} : \{o_1^1, \ldots, o_m^1, o_1^2, \ldots, o_m^2\}$ where e^i , for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, is obtained by replacing all registers x with x^i in expression e.

Stuttering product circuit. While the product circuit allows us to reason about pairs of executions, we need another ingredient to check microarchitectural contract satisfaction, as it refers to the *filtered semantics* over a predicate ϕ . We cannot directly check the filtered semantics on the product circuit, as ϕ may be satisfied at different times. Instead, we modify the product circuit to synchronize the two executions based on ϕ . Given a circuit $C = \{x_1 \leftarrow e_1, \dots, x_n \leftarrow e_n\} : o_1, \dots, o_m$, we define its *stuttering product circuit* over predicate ϕ , denoted by $C \times_{\phi} C$, by replacing each assignment $x^1 \leftarrow e^1$ in the product circuit $C \times C$ with $x^1 \leftarrow$ if $\phi^1 \wedge \neg \phi^2$ th x^1 el e^1 and, similarly, by replacing each $x^2 \leftarrow e^2$ in the product circuit $C \times C$ with $x^2 \leftarrow$ if $\phi^2 \wedge \neg \phi^1$ th x^2 el e^2 . This transformation ensures that whenever ϕ holds in one execution but not the other, the execution where ϕ holds "waits" for the other one to catch up.

Example 11. Consider the circuit $N = \{i \leftarrow i + 1\} : \{i\}$. Forming the product yields $N \times N = \{i^1 \leftarrow i^1 + 1, i^2 \leftarrow i^2 + 1\} : \{i^1, i^2\}$. Let us define filter predicate $\phi = (i \mod 2 = 0)$. We get $\phi^1 = (i^1 \mod 2 = 0)$, and $\phi^2 = (i^2 \mod 2 = 0)$, and

$$N \times_{\phi} N = \begin{cases} i^1 \leftarrow \text{if } \phi^1 \wedge \neg \phi^2 \text{ th } i^1 \text{ el } i^1 + 1, \\ i^2 \leftarrow \text{if } \phi^2 \wedge \neg \phi^1 \text{ th } i^2 \text{ el } i^2 + 1 \end{cases} : \{i^1, i^2\} \ .$$

Let us fix $\mu_I(i^1)=0$ and $\mu_I(i^2)=1$. We only want to compare states where both ϕ^1 and ϕ^2 hold, *i.e.*, we want to compare the filtered semantics $[\![N]\!]|\phi(\mu^1)$ and $[\![N]\!]|\phi(\mu^2)$, where $\mu^1(i)=0$ and $\mu^2(i)=1$. In $N\times N$ the two runs are out of sync and $N\times N$, $\mu_I\models\Box(\phi^1\leftrightarrow\neg\phi^2)$. In contrast, $N\times_\phi N$ synchronizes the two runs. As initially ϕ^1 holds but ϕ^2 does not, only i^2 gets incremented and, afterwards, the two copies run in lockstep. We can now check properties of the filtered semantics, e.g., that $N\times_\phi N$, $\mu_I\models\Box(\phi^1\wedge\phi^2\to i^2=i^1+2)$ holds.

Algorithm idea. We now now use the stuttering product circuit to verify that $LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK$ holds. This requires us to show that all executions whose filtered semantics produce the same contract observations always produce the same attacker observations (see Definition 3). We start by adding an assumption to only consider runs of $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL}$ that are contract equivalent. We encode this via the formula $\Phi_{ctr-equiv} \coloneqq (\phi^1 \wedge \phi^2 \to \psi_{equiv}^{LM}),$ where $\psi_{equiv}^{M} := \bigwedge_{o \in M.O} o^{1} = o^{2}$ for a monitor M. We then only consider runs that satisfy $\Box \Phi_{ctr-equiv}$. Next, our algorithm learns an inductive invariant LI over the stuttering product circuit under our assumption. This invariant holds on all reachable states of the circuit. Finally, our algorithm uses the invariant to prove that indeed all executions of the circuit are attacker equivalent. For this we show that $LI \to \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$ holds. Note that we prove this property over $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL}$, however the consequent of $\mathit{LI} \rightarrow \psi_{equiv}^{\mathit{ATK}}$ is stated over the unfiltered semantics. To ensure that the stuttering semantics is equivalent to the regular one, we also prove $LI \to (\phi^1 \leftrightarrow \phi^2)$, i.e., no stuttering occurs on contract equivalent traces.

Algorithm description. We implement this approach in Algorithm 1. It relies on the procedure Learninv, which we use to learn invariants over the stuttering product circuit. We first present Verify and later discuss Learninv.

Function Verify is the entry point of our verification approach. It takes as input a μ VLOG microarchitecture IMPL (the processor under verification), a leakage monitor LM (capturing the allowed leaks),

an attacker monitor ATK (capturing what the attacker can observe), and a retirement predicate ϕ . To verify unbounded properties like $LM \ge_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK$, the algorithm relies on inductive reasoning. For this reason, Verify additionally take as input (1) a set of candidate invariants CI over the stuttering circuit (which will be verified using LEARNINV) as well as (2) a lookahead $b \in \mathbb{N}^+$. In line 2, we construct $\Phi_{initial}$ (over the stuttering circuit $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL}$) capturing the initial conditions for pairs of executions relevant for our check. In $\Phi_{initial}$, $\psi_{init}^{IMPL^1}$ and $\psi_{init}^{IMPL^2}$ capture that the two executions start from valid initial states, whereas $\psi_{equiv}^{\mu ARCH}$ ensures that the two executions initially agree on all registers in $\mu ARCH$, i.e., $\psi^{\mu ARCH}_{equiv} :=$ $\bigwedge_{x \in \mu ARCH} x^1 = x^2$. In line 3, we construct $\Phi_{ctr-equiv} := (\phi^1 \land \phi^1)$ $\phi^2 \xrightarrow{} \psi^{LM}_{equiv})$ ensuring that contract observations are equivalent. In line 4, we call the LEARNINV procedure to verify which of the candidate invariants in CI are, indeed, invariants. Hence, the learned invariants LI hold for any two contract-indistinguishable states, i.e., $C \models (\Phi_{initial} \land \Box \Phi_{ctr-equiv}) \rightarrow \Box \land LI \text{ holds where } \land LI \text{ stands for}$ $\bigwedge_{\phi \in LI} \phi$. Finally, in line 5 we check whether the learned invariants are sufficient to ensure that (1) the attacker observations are the same and (2) the predicate ϕ is always synchronized between the two executions. If this is the case, Verify has successfully verified that $LM \succeq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH,\phi} ATK$ holds; see Theorem 2. The LearnInv procedure learns, using inductive verification,

which of the candidate invariants are true invariants using an approach similar to the Houdini tool [20]. LEARNINV takes as input a circuit C, a formula capturing initial conditions $\Phi_{initial}$, a formula $\Phi_{assumption}$ that runs always need to satisfy, a bound b, and a set of candidate invariants CI. The procedure outputs the formulas in CI that can be proved to be invariants, i.e., for which $C \models (\Phi_{initial} \land \Box \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \Box \land LI \text{ holds. Concretely, Learn-}$ INV consists of a base case (lines 7-13) and an induction step (lines 14-20). Both parts follow a similar structure—they iteratively rule out invalid invariants based on counterexamples-and they differ only in the checked property: Ψ_{base} checks that for any state for which the initial conditions hold and for which the assumptions are satisfied for the next b cycles, the invariants must also hold. In contrast, $\Psi_{induction}$ checks that for any state for which the invariants hold and for which the assumptions are satisfied for the next b cycles, the invariants hold in the next cycle as well. Bound *b* controls for how many cycles to unroll the assumption $\Box \Phi_{assumption}$. Unrolling the assumption is important for circuits where a difference in attacker observation occurs before a corresponding difference in contract observations. This may happen, e.g., if a leak occurs early in the pipeline and is later justified by a difference in contrast observations at retirement. It therefore often suffices to bound b by the processor's pipeline depth.

Soundness: Theorem 2 states that whenever Algorithm 1 returns \top , then microarchitectural contract satisfaction holds.

Theorem 2. $VERIFY(IMPL, LM, ATK, \phi, b, RI) \Rightarrow LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi}$

Example 12. Consider again our running example M from Example 4. We want to verify that $sLM \geq_{sIMP}^{\{st,res,ret\},\phi} sAT$ holds. We start by building the stuttering product circuit $sIMP \times_{\phi} sIMP$

Algorithm 1 LeaVe verification approach

Input: Microarchitecture IMPL, leakage monitor LM, attacker ATK, retirement predicate ϕ , lookahead b, candidate invariants CI

```
1: procedure Verify(IMPL, LM, ATK, \phi, b, CI)
              \Phi_{initial} := \psi_{init}^{IMPL^{1}} \wedge \psi_{init}^{IMPL^{2}} \wedge \psi_{equiv}^{\mu ARCH}
              \Phi_{ctr-equiv} := (\phi^1 \wedge \phi^2 \rightarrow \psi_{equiv}^{LM})
              \begin{split} LI \coloneqq \text{LearnInv}(\textit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \textit{IMPL}, \Phi_{\textit{initial}}, \Phi_{\textit{ctr-equiv}}, b, CI) \\ \textbf{return} \; \textit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \textit{IMPL} \models \bigwedge LI \rightarrow \psi_{\textit{equiv}}^{ATK} \wedge (\phi^1 \leftrightarrow \phi^2) \end{split}
 6: procedure LearnInv(C, \Phi_{initial}, \Phi_{assumption}, b, CI)
 7:
                                                                                                               ▶ base case
                       \Psi_{base} := (\Phi_{initial} \wedge \Box^b \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \bigwedge CI
 8:
                      if C \models \Psi_{base} then
 9
10:
                              break
                      else
                              Let \mu be the counterexample
12:
                              CI := \{ \phi \in CI \mid \mu \models \phi \}
13:
                                                                                                                 ▶ ind. step
14:
                       \Psi_{inductive} := (\bigwedge CI \wedge \Box^b \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \circ \bigwedge CI
15:
                      if C \models \Psi_{inductive} then
16:
                             return CI
17:
18
                              Let \mu be the counterexample
19:
                              CI := \{ \phi \in CI \mid \mu \models \phi \}
20:
```

with respect to retirement predicate $\phi = (ret = 1)$. We can assume that the two runs produce the same contract observations, whenever both runs retire. We capture this assumption in formula $\Phi_{ctr-equiv} := (ret^1 = 1 \land ret^2 = 1 \rightarrow m^1[pc^1] = m^2[pc^2])$, which we assume to hold throughout the execution. Next, we want to learn an inductive invariant over $sIMP \times_{\phi} sIMP$ under assumption $\square \Phi_{ctr-equiv}$. We pick the following set of candidate invariants.

$$CI = \begin{cases} pc^{1} = pc^{2}, st^{1} = st^{2}, res^{1} = res^{2}, ret^{1} = ret^{2} \\ st^{1} = 0 \rightarrow ret^{1} = 1, st^{1} = 1 \rightarrow ret^{1} = 1 \end{cases}$$

Procedure LearnInv starts by checking the invariant candidates on the initial state. We set bound b to 1. Since in all valid initial states μ , we have $\mu(pc)=1$, $\mu(st)=0$, and all microarchitectural variables are assumed to be equal via $\Phi_{initial}$ we retain all candidate invariants. Next, LearnInv checks whether the candidate invariants are preserved under transitions. That is, if we assume the invariant holds and take a transition step, the invariant must still hold. Since our invariant does not require memory m to be equal in both runs, taking the else branch in line 3 of sIMP (see Example 4) produces a counterexample where $res^1 \neq res^2$ and we remove the corresponding invariant. Similarly, taking the else branch in line 3 produces a state where $st^1=1$ and $ret^1=0$ and LearnInv removes the invariant as well. The remaining candidate invariants are preserved under transitions and the procedure returns. This leaves us with the following set of learned invariants.

$$LI = \begin{cases} pc^1 = pc^2, st^1 = st^2, ret^1 = ret^2 \\ st^1 = 0 \rightarrow ret^1 = 1 \end{cases}$$

Finally, procedure Verify checks whether the conjunction of the learned invariants implies that attacker observations and retirement

are the same in both runs. For our example, this means checking that the following implication holds.

$$\begin{pmatrix} pc^1 = pc^2 \wedge st^1 = st^2 \wedge \\ ret^1 = ret^2 \wedge st^1 = 0 \rightarrow ret^1 = 1 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} pc^1 = pc^2 \wedge \\ (ret^1 = 1) \leftrightarrow (ret^2 = 1) \end{pmatrix}$$

As the implication is valid, we have proved microarchitectural contract satisfaction.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we present the Leave verification tool, which implements the verification approach from §4.2 for Verilog. Leave uses the Yosys Open Synthesis Suite [7] for processing Verilog circuits, the Icarus Verilog simulator [4] for simulating counterexamples, and the Yices SMT solver [6] for verification.

Inputs: LeaVe takes as input (1) the processor under verification (PUV) *IMPL* implemented in Verilog, (2) a leakage monitor formalized as Verilog expressions over *IMPL*'s architectural state, (3) an attacker expressed as Verilog expressions over *IMPL*, (4) a retirement predicate ϕ expressed as a Boolean condition over *IMPL*, and (5) a lookahead $b \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Users can provide candidate relational invariants as expressions e over *IMPL* and LeaVe will construct the candidate invariant $e^1 = e^2$. Users can also provide additional invariants over individual executions of *IMPL* to help ruling out spurious counterexamples. e

Workflow: Leave works in two steps that follows Algorithm 1. First, Leave determines the greatest subset of the provided can-

First, Leave determines the greatest subset of the provided candidate relational invariants that is inductive. For this, Leave implements the Learninv function from Algorithm 1 (described below). In addition to the user provided candidate invariants, the set of candidate invariants for Learninv contains: (1) *all* relational formulas of the form $x^1 = x^2$ where x is a register or wire in *IMPL*, (2) formulas of the form $e_{ATK}^1 = e_{ATK}^2$ for all expressions e_{ATK} in the provided attacker, and (3) the invariant $\phi^1 \leftrightarrow \phi^2$ indicating that the retirement witness is always synchronized between the two executions.

Next, Leave analyzes the learned invariants to determine if they're sufficient to prove security with respect to the given attacker. For this, Leave checks if the invariants associated with the attacker and with the retirement witness are part of the set of learned invariants, which is sufficient to ensure the satisfiability of the check at line 5 in Algorithm 1.

Implementation of LearnInv: Leave's implementation of LearnInv follows Algorithm 1: (1) It constructs the stuttering product circuit by combining two copies of the PUV and using the provided retired witness ϕ to synchronize the two executions (as described in §4.2). (2) Then, it inlines the property to be verified (i.e., Ψ_{base} and $\Psi_{inductive}$ from Algorithm 1) as assume and assert Verilog statements in the product circuit. (3) Next, it checks whether the property holds. (4) Whenever a property is not satisfied, Leave analyzes the counterexample to determine which candidate relational invariants are violated (lines 12-13 and 19-20 in Algorithm 1)

For (1) and (2), we implemented dedicated Yosys passes that construct the stuttering product circuit and inline candidate relational invariants. For (3), Leave uses Yosys to encode the product circuit and the verification queries into SMT logical formulas and the Yosys-BMC [7] backend to verify the property with the Yices SMT solver (using the lookahead b as verification bound). For (4), when verification fails, Yosys-BMC translates the SMT counterexample into a Verilog testbench. Leave instruments the testbench to monitor the value of all candidate invariants, simulates the testbench using Icarus Verilog, and discards the violated invariants.

6 EVALUATION

This section reports on our use of Leave to verify the security of three open-source RISC-V processors. We start by introducing our methodology (§6.1): the processors we analyze, the leakage contracts and attacker we consider, and the experimental setup. In our evaluation (§6.2), we address the following three research questions: $\mathbf{Q1}$: Can Leave be used to reason about the security of open-source RISC-V processors? $\mathbf{Q2}$: What is the impact of varying the lookahead b on verification time? $\mathbf{Q3}$: What is the impact of decoupling security and functional correctness on verification?

6.1 Methodology

Benchmarks: We consider the following benchmarks.

- **RE**: The simple processor from §2. The log_time_mul module is implemented using shift operations (logarithmic in the number of the multiplier's bits), inspired by one of Ibex's multipliers [3].
- **DarkRISCV**: A RISC-V processor implementing most of the RISC-V RV32E and RV32I instruction set [1]. The processor is inorder and single-issue, and we analyzed the 2-stage (**DarkRISCV-2**) and 3-stage (**DarkRISCV-3**) versions of DarkRISCV.
- **Sodor**: An educational RISC-V processor [5]. We analyzed the 2-stage version of Sodor implementing the RV32I instruction set. During verification, we assume that (1) all fetched instructions are legal, (2) no exceptions or interrupts are raised during execution, and (3) no eret instructions are executed.
- Ibex: An open-source, production-quality 32-bit RISC-V CPU core [2]. We targeted Ibex in its "small" configuration, which is the default configuration and which underwent functional correctness verification. The processor has two stages and supports the RV32IMC instruction set. In our experiments, we consider three variants of Ibex: (1) Ibex-small is the default "small" configuration with constant-time multiplication (three cycles) and without caches, (2) Ibex-slow-mult employs a non-constant-time multiplication unit whose execution time depends on the operands [3], and (3) Ibex-cache is the Ibex-small version which we extended with a simple (single-line) cache. For verifying Ibex processors, we pose several restrictions. First, we assume that debug mode is disabled and that all fetched instructions are legal and not compressed. Further, we assume that memory operations are aligned at word boundaries. We also ignore the following instructions: ebrk, mret, dret, ecall, wfi, fence, remw, remuw. To reduce verification time and the needed lookahead b, we also ignore div and divu

 $^{^5\}mathrm{As}$ a rule of thumb, a "safe" choice for b is the maximum number of cycles needed for an instruction to traverse the pipeline (from fetch to retire).

⁶LEAVE only verifies the relational invariants, which concern security. Invariants over *IMPL*, which concern functional correctness, are assumed and not checked by the tool.

 $^{^7{\}rm Ibex}$ is written in System Verilog. To analyze it with LeaVe, we first translate it into plain Verilog using scripts from Ibex's developers.

instructions (which take 37 cycles to be executed) and, for **Ibex-slow-mult**, we further assume that the operands of multiplication instructions are less than four.

Leakage contracts: We consider leakage contracts constructed by composing the following building blocks:

- I: This contract exposes the architectural program counter and the corresponding instruction retrieved from memory.
- **B**: This contract exposes the architectural outcome of (direct and indirect) branch instructions. That is, for conditional branches, the contract exposes the architectural value of the condition.
- M: This contract exposes the addresses accessed by load and store memory instructions.
- **O**: This contract exposes the operands of mul and imul multiplication instructions.

In the following, we write A+B to denote the composition of contracts A and B. For instance, I+B+M is the contract that exposes everything exposed by I, B, and M. This contract corresponds to the standard constant-time model [8]. We order contracts by the amount of information they leak, where stronger contracts leak less. For example, I is stronger than I+B as it exposes less information. For each processor from §6.1, we implemented all the abovementioned contracts and their combinations as leakage monitors over the processor's architectural state.

Attacker: For all processors from §6.1, we implemented an attacker monitor that observes when instructions retire by exposing the value of the retirement witness predicate at each cycle.

Additional candidate invariants: For **DarkRISCV**, **Sodor**, and **Ibex**, we manually specified candidate relational invariants capturing that "if instructions enter a pipeline stage in both executions, then the instructions are the same in both executions". Moreover, for **Ibex-cache**, we also added a candidate invariant capturing that "if both executions are executing a load instruction, then the signals detecting a cache hit is the same." All these invariants can be formalized as formulas of the form $e^1 = e^2 \rightarrow e'^1 = e'^2$. These are not part of the invariants automatically generated by Leave, which are of the simpler form $e^1 = e^2$.

Experimental setup: All our experiments are run on a Ubuntu 20.04 virtual machine with 8 CPU cores and 32 GB of RAM running on Linux KVM on a server with 4 Xeon Gold 6154 CPUs and 512 GB of DDR4 RAM. We configured LEAVE to run with Yosys version 0.24 + 10, Icarus Verilog version 12.0, and Yices version 2.6.4.

6.2 Results

Q1: Reasoning about open source processors: To evaluate whether Leave can verify the security guarantees of open-source processors, we use it to prove microarchitectural contract satisfaction against an attacker ATK that observes when instructions are retired. For each processor P and contract LM from §6.1, we use Leave to check whether the attacker monitor ATK leaks less than the leakage monitor LM.

Figure 8 reports (1) the strongest contract that is satisfied against *ATK*, (2) the time needed to verify that the strongest contract is satisfied,⁸ (3) the total number of iterations taken by LEARNINV for the base and induction steps (i.e., the number of issued SMT

Processor	Strongest contract	Verification time (in minutes)	LEARNINV iterations	b
RE	0	1.5	10	33
DarkRISCV-2	I	7.2	52	2
DarkRISCV-3	I	11.1	83	2
Sodor-2	I + B	97.8	85	1
Ibex-small	I + B	118.7	67	3
Ibex-slow-mult	I + B + O	110.5	62	3
Ibex-cache	I + B + M	139.8	64	4

Figure 8: Verification results for our benchmarks. For each processor, the table indicates the strongest satisfied contract (i.e., the one exposing the least amount of information) against an attacker observing when instructions retire.

queries), and (4) the minimum lookahead b for which verification worked. We highlight the following findings:

- For the **RE** processor from §2, LEAVE successfully verified contract satisfaction against the contract **O** exposing the multiplication's operand in 1.5 minutes with a lookahead of 33. Such a lookahead is needed to ensure that in-flight multiplications are retired and the corresponding contract observation is produced.
- For **DarkRISCV**, LEAVE proves contract satisfaction against the **I** contract, which exposes the current program counter and the loaded instruction, in 7 minutes for the two-stage version **DarkRISCV-2** and around 11 minutes for the (more complex) three-stage version **DarkRISCV-3**.
- Differently from DarkRISCV, both Sodor-2 and Ibex-small only satisfy the weaker I+B contract, which additionally exposes the outcome of branch instructions. This arises from both processors employing a simple form of branch prediction (which predicts that the branch is always not taken) that results in a timing leak because mispredictions trigger a pipeline flush. Consider the following instruction (returned by LEAVE as a counterexample when trying to prove satisfaction against I) $i \triangleq beq t_1 t_2 pc + 4$ at address pc, which conditionally jumps to pc + 4 if registers t_1 and t_2 have the same value. The next instruction will *always* be the one at address pc+4 (so, executions will be equivalent under contract I). However, executing i on Sodor-2 and Ibex-small will take a different number of cycles depending on whether t_1 and t_2 are equal. Note that the difference in complexity between **Sodor-2** (a simple educational processor) and Ibex-small (a production-quality processor) is reflected in the difference in the time taken by a single LEARNINV iteration (1.1 versus 1.7 minutes on average).
- For **Ibex-slow-mult**, Leave can only prove security against the **I+B+O** contract, which also exposes the operands to multiplication instructions. This captures the effects of the non-constant-time multiplier used in **Ibex-slow-mult**, whose execution time is proportional to the logarithm of the multiplication operands. From a verification perspective, the lookahead for **Ibex-slow-mult** relies on the maximum number of cycles that an instruction can spend in the pipeline. In our case, 3 is sufficient because we bounded the size of multiplication operands (to being representable using 2 bits).
- For **Ibex-cache**, LEAVE can only prove security against the **I+B+M** contract, which also exposes the accessed memory addresses, with a lookahead of 4. This reflects the effects of our single-line cache which requires 3 cycles for hits and 4 cycles for misses.

 $^{^8}$ Figure 8 does *not* report the time for (unsuccessful) verification of weaker contracts.

b	Verification time (in minutes)	LearnInv iterations	Time per iteration (in minutes)	Number of invariants
1	97.8	85	1.15	1732
2	81.9	63	1.3	1770
3	123.5	81	1.52	1776
5	102.9	59	1.74	1776
10	174.4	63	2.77	1776
20	497.6	60	8.29	1776

Figure 9: Verification time for Sodor against the I+B contract for different lookaheads b.

Q2: Impact of lookahead: Leave's verification queries are parametric in the lookahead b. A larger lookahead corresponds to stronger assumptions and may thus enable learning stronger invariants. This, however, comes at the cost of more complex queries to the SMT solver, which increases solving time. To understand the impact of increasing b, we use Leave to analyze the **Sodor** processor against the **I+B** contract for different values of $b \in \{1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20\}$.

Figure 9 reports the total verification time, the total number of iterations taken by the LearnInv sub-procedure for the base and induction steps (i.e., the number of issued SMT queries), the time per iteration, and the number of invariants learned. Our results indicate that increasing the lookahead b results in slower iterations of LearnInv and in more invariants. For instance, increasing the bound from 1 to 20 results in increasing the iteration time from 1.15 to 8.29 minutes. The total number of LearnInv iterations (and, thus, the total verification time), however, varies depending on which counterexamples the SMT solver returns.

Q3: Impact of decoupling: To understand the impact of checking microarchitectural contract satisfaction using our decoupling theorem versus checking contract satisfaction directly using an architectural model *ISA* (c.f. Definition 2), we modified LeaVe to directly prove contract satisfaction according to Definition 2. For this, we (1) replace the construction of the stuttering circuit $IMPL \times_{\phi} IMPL$ with the product circuit $ISA \times ISA \times IMPL \times IMPL$ and (2) modify the construction of the $\Psi_{initial}$ and $\Psi_{contract}$ formulae, whereas the rest (e.g., the LearnInv procedure) is the same. We refer to this modified version of LeaVe as 4way-LeaVe (see Algorithm 2 in appendix).

We analyzed the **Sodor** processor against the **I**+**B** contract using both Leave and 4way-Leave. We focused our analysis on **Sodor** because it comes with a Verilog ISA model (i.e., 1-stage **Sodor**).

In our experiments, when using a lookahead of b=2, LeaVe successfully proved that the **I+B** is satisfied in 97.8 minutes. In contrast, 4way-LeaVe tool proved contract satisfaction in 33.5 hours. This illustrates that, even for the simple 2-stage **Sodor** processor, directly proving Definition 2 is impractical. It also confirms that our decoupling theorem (Theorem 1) is instrumental in enabling practical automated proofs of contract satisfaction for realistic hardware.

7 RELATED WORK

Hardware verification for security: UPEC [19] is an approach for detecting confidentiality violations in RTL circuits. Similarly to Definition 3, the UPEC property is defined as a non-interference-style property over pairs of microarchitectural executions. However, the security property verified in [19] is fixed, it specifically focuses on microarchitectural leaks due to transitive execution, and it is not

directly based on an ISA-level specification, i.e., it does not check a leakage contract. In contrast, our approach supports arbitrary leakage contracts that can be defined at ISA-level.

Bloem et al. [10] propose an approach for verifying power leakage models for RTL circuits, which differs from Leave in two key ways: (1) They target power side channels, whereas LeaVe focuses on software-visible microarchitectural leaks. This is reflected in different notions of contract satisfaction: the one from [10] is probabilistic and related to threshold non-interference, whereas ours is related to standard non-interference. (2) Their verification approach needs a user-provided simulation mapping that "specifies for all registers in the hardware [..] a location in the contract modeling the hardware location" [10, §3.4] where a location is a register or an input. Defining such a mapping can be challenging for complex processors, e.g., registers of stateful microarchitectural components (like caches or predictors) may depend on multiple instructions. LEAVE does not need such a mapping for checking contract satisfaction; it only needs (automatically synthesized or manually provided) candidate relational invariants over the microarchitecture.

Iodine [21] and Xenon [43] check if the execution time of an RTL circuit is *input independent* given a partitioning of the circuit's inputs into secret and public. This partitioning is too coarse to support leakage contracts, where the notion of what is "secret" depends on the executed instructions. Finally, secure Hardware Description Languages [17, 49] aim at building secure processors by construction. They require partitioning registers and inputs into secret and public, which is too coarse-grained for leakage contracts.

Hardware verification for functional correctness: A multitude of approaches for verifying functional correctness of processors have been proposed [13, 26, 28, 31, 39, 42, 48]. Some of these approaches adopt a notion of ISA compliance similar to Definition 1. For instance, Reid et al. [42] illustrate a verification approach (used internally at ARM) for checking compliance between a microarchitecture and a reference architectural model, where the notion of ISA compliance requires that all changes to the architectural state are reflected by a "step" of the reference model (similarly to Definition 1).

The Instruction-Level Abstraction (ILA) project [26, 48, 50] aims to specify and verify instruction-level models of processors and accelerators. They present techniques for (1) checking whether an RTL implementation correctly implements an ILA model, (2) determining which parts of a processor's state are architectural [48], and (3) deriving processor invariants [50]. Some of these techniques can help in LeaVe's verification. For instance, [48] can help in identifying the *ARCH* and $\mu ARCH$ sets, whereas [50] can complement LeaVe's invariant learning approach.

Finally, fuzzing approaches [14, 29] can detect violations of ISA compliance, but they cannot prove functional correctness.

Detecting leaks through testing: Revizor [37, 38] and Scam-V [11, 36] can test for contract violations (i.e., they find counterexamples to Definition 2) for black-box CPUs. However, they require physical access to a CPU and can be applied only post-silicon. Other approaches [22, 33, 46] instead detect leaks by analyzing hardware measurements without the help of a formal leakage model but,

again, apply only post-silicon. Finally, SpecDoctor [27] and Sig-Fuzz [41] can test for leaks on RTL designs and they are applicable in the pre-silicon phase. Differently from LeaVe, all these approaches *cannot* prove the absence of leaks.

Formal leakage models: Researchers have proposed many formal models for studying microarchitectural security at program level, ranging from simple models associated with "constant-time programming" [8, 34] to more complex ones capturing leaks associated with speculatively executed instructions [15, 18, 23–25, 40, 45]. Most of these models focus at the software level and have no formal connection with leaks in hardware implementations. In contrast, [25, 35] propose frameworks for formalizing security contracts between hardware and software. Our notion of contract satisfaction (Definition 2) is inspired by the framework from [25], which we instantiate and adapt for reasoning about RTL processors.

8 CONCLUSION

We presented an approach for verifying RTL processor designs against ISA-level leakage contracts. We implemented our approach in the LeaVe verification tool, which we use to characterize the side-channel security guarantees of three open-source RISC-V processors. This demonstrates that leakage contracts can be successfully applied to RTL processors. It also paves the way for linking recent advances on specification [25, 35] and software analysis [15, 18, 23, 24, 45] for leakage contracts to RTL processors.

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Figure 10: μ VLoG semantics. ε is the empty sequence and \cdot is the concatenation operator. As is standard, we have that $\tau \cdot \varepsilon = \tau$ and $\varepsilon \cdot \tau = \tau$.

A μ VLOG SEMANTICS

The full semantics of μ VLOG is given in Figure 10.

B A TEMPORAL LOGIC FOR μ VLog

Here, we introduce a logic for expressing temporal properties of μ VLog circuits. Formulas Φ in this logic are constructed by combining μ VLog predicates ϕ with temporal operators \circ (denoting "in the next cycle"), \square (denoting "for the next B cycles"), \square (denoting "always in the future"), and the usual boolean operators. Its semantics is the following:

$$C \models \Phi \text{ if } C, \mu, 0 \models \Phi \text{ for all } \mu \in states(C)$$

$$C, \mu, i \models \phi \text{ if } \llbracket C \rrbracket (\mu, i) \models \phi$$

$$C, \mu, i \models \circ \Phi \text{ if } C, \mu, i + 1 \models \Phi$$

$$C, \mu, i \models \Box^k \Phi \text{ if } C, \mu, i + j \models \Phi \text{ for all } j < k$$

$$C, \mu, i \models \Box \Phi \text{ if } C, \mu, i + j \models \Phi \text{ for all } j \in \mathbb{N}$$

C PROOFS

Here, we present the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, which we restate below for simplicity.

Theorem (Decoupling Theorem). If $IMPL \equiv_{\phi} ISA$ holds for retirement predicate ϕ , then

$$LM \succeq^{\mu ARCH, \phi}_{IMPL} ATK \Leftrightarrow LM[ISA] \sqsupseteq ATK[IMPL].$$

PROOF. We assume $IMPL \equiv_{\phi} ISA$ and prove the two directions.

⇒: Let $\mu, \mu' \in init(IMPL)$ be such that $\mu \sim_{\mu ARCH} \mu'$ and

$$[LM[ISA]](\mu) = [LM[ISA]](\mu').$$

Since $\mathit{IMPL} \equiv_{\phi} \mathit{ISA}$ and LM is a monitoring circuit for ISA , we get

$$\llbracket LM[IMPL] \rrbracket | \phi(\mu) = \llbracket LM[IMPL] \rrbracket | \phi(\mu').$$

From $LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK$, we get

$$[ATK[IMPL]](\mu) = [ATK[IMPL]](\mu').$$

Therefore, $LM[ISA] \supseteq ATK[IMPL]$.

⇐: Let $\mu, \mu' \in init(IMPL)$ be such that $\mu \sim_{\mu ARCH} \mu'$ and

$$\llbracket LM[\mathit{IMPL}] \rrbracket | \phi(\mu) = \llbracket LM[\mathit{IMPL}] \rrbracket | \phi(\mu').$$

Since $IMPL \equiv_{\phi} ISA$ and LM is a monitoring circuit for ISA, we get

$$[LM[ISA]](\mu) = [LM[ISA]](\mu').$$

From $LM[ISA] \supseteq ATK[IMPL]$, we get

$$[ATK[IMPL]](\mu) = [ATK[IMPL]](\mu').$$

Therefore,
$$LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK$$
.

Theorem. $Verify(IMPL, LM, ATK, \phi, b, RI) \Rightarrow LM \geq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH, \phi} ATK$

PROOF. We split the proof in two steps.

Soundness of LearnInv: Here, we show that the outcome of invariant learning, $LI := \text{LearnInv}(C, \Phi_{initial}, \Phi_{assumption}, b, CI)$ is a set of invariants of C in all executions that satisfy $\Phi_{assumption}$ in every cycle. In other words, $C \models (\Phi_{initial} \land \Box \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \Box \land LI$.

Let μ be an arbitrary valuation for C such that (a) C, μ , $0 \models \Phi_{initial}$ and (b) C, μ , $0 \models \Box \Phi_{assumption}$. We now show, by induction on i, that C, μ , $i \models \wedge LI$.

Base case: We need to show that $C, \mu, 0 \models \bigwedge LI$ holds. Since LI has been returned by LearnInv, we know that $C \models \Psi_{base}$ holds for a set of invariants $CI \supseteq LI$. From this, we have that $C, \mu, 0 \models (\Phi_{initial} \land \Box^b \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \bigwedge LI$. From (a) and (b), we get $C, \mu, 0 \models \Phi_{initial} \land \Box^b \Phi_{assumption}$. Thus we can conclude $C, \mu, 0 \models \bigwedge LI$.

Induction step: We now show that $C, \mu, i \models \bigwedge LI$ holds given that $C, \mu, j \models \bigwedge LI$ holds for all j < i. Let μ' be the valuation reached in i - 1 steps from μ . Since LI has been returned by LEARNINV, we know that $C \models \Psi_{inductive}$ holds for CI = LI. From this, we have that $C, \mu', 0 \models (\bigwedge LI \land \Box^b \Phi_{assumption}) \rightarrow \\$ $\land \land LI$ holds. From the induction hypothesis, we have that $C, \mu, i - 1 \models \bigwedge LI$ holds and, therefore, we get $C, \mu', 0 \models \\$ $\land LI$. From $C, \mu, 0 \models \Box \Phi_{assumption}$, we also get $C, \mu', 0 \models \\$ $\Box^b \Phi_{assumption}$. Therefore, we can derive $C, \mu', 0 \models \\$ $\land LI$.

Algorithm 2 4WAY-LEAVE verification approach

Input: Microarchitecture *IMPL*, architecture *ISA*, leakage monitor LM, attacker ATK, retirement predicate ϕ , lookahead b, candidate invariants CI

```
1: procedure Verify(IMPL, LM, ATK, \phi, b, CI)
2: \psi_{equiv}^{\mu ARCH} := \bigwedge_{r \in \mu ARCH} r^3 = r^4
3: \psi_{archEquiv} := \bigwedge_{r \in ARCH} r^1 = r^3 \wedge r^2 = r^4
4: \Phi_{initial} := \psi_{init}^{ISA^1} \wedge \psi_{init}^{ISA^2} \wedge \psi_{init}^{IMPL^3} \wedge \psi_{init}^{IMPL^4} \wedge \psi_{archEquiv} \wedge \psi_{equiv}^{\mu ARCH}
5: \Phi_{ctr-equiv} := \bigwedge_{o \in LM.O} o^1 = o^2
6: LI := \text{LearnInv}(ISA \times ISA \times IMPL \times IMPL}, \Phi_{initial}, \Phi_{ctr-equiv}, b, CI)
7: return ISA \times ISA \times IMPL \times IMPL \models \bigwedge LI \rightarrow \bigwedge_{o \in ATK.O} o^3 = o^4
```

From this, we get $C, \mu', 1 \models \bigwedge LI$. From this and μ' being reached from μ in i-1 steps, we get $C, \mu, i \models \bigwedge LI$.

Soundness of Verify: Assume, for contradiction's sake, that Verify(*IMPL*, *LM*, *ATK*, ϕ , *ARCH*, b, *RI*) = \top and *LM* $\succeq_{IMPL}^{\mu ARCH,\phi}$ *ATK* does not hold. From the latter, there are two $\mu ARCH$ -equivalent initial valuations μ,μ' such that $[\![LM[IMPL]]\!]|\phi(\mu)$ = $[\![LM[IMPL]]\!]|\phi(\mu')$ and $[\![ATK[IMPL]]\!](\mu) \neq [\![ATK[IMPL]]\!](\mu')$. Thus:

- From μ, μ' being initial valuations, we have IMPL×_φ IMPL, μ× μ', 0 ⊨ ψ^{IMPL1}_{init} ∧ ψ^{IMPL2}_{init}.
 From μ, μ' being μARCH-equivalent, we have IMPL ×_φ
- (2) From μ, μ' being $\mu ARCH$ -equivalent, we have $IMPL \times_{\phi} IMPL, \mu \times \mu', 0 \models \psi_{equiv}^{\mu ARCH}$.
- (3) From $[LM[IMPL]] | \hat{\phi}(\mu) = [LM[IMPL]] | \phi(\mu')$, we have that $IMPL \times_{\phi} IMPL, \mu \times \mu', 0 \models \Box \Phi_{ctr}$.
- (4) Finally, from $[ATK[IMPL]](\mu) \neq [ATK[IMPL]](\mu')$, we have that $IMPL \times IMPL$, $\mu \times \mu'$, $0 \not\models \Box \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$. Moreover, from Verify(IMPL, LM, ATK, ϕ , b, RI) = \top , we have that $IMPL \times_{\phi} IMPL \models \Box \psi^1 \leftrightarrow \psi^2$. Therefore, from $IMPL \times IMPL$, $\mu \times \mu'$, $0 \not\models \Box \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$ we also get $IMPL \times_{\phi} IMPL$, $\mu \times \mu'$, $0 \not\models \Box \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$ because the stuttering never happens since ϕ is always synchronized in the two executions.

Moreover, from Verify(*IMPL*, *LM*, *ATK*, ϕ , *b*, *RI*) = \top , there is a set *CI* returned by LearnInv such that $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL} \models \bigwedge_{\psi \in \mathit{CI}} \psi \to \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$. From (1)–(3) and the soundness of LearnInv (proved above), we have that $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL}, \mu \times \mu'$, $0 \models \Box \bigwedge_{\psi \in \mathit{CI}} \psi$. From this and $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL} \models \bigwedge_{\psi \in \mathit{CI}} \psi \to \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$, we have $\mathit{IMPL} \times_{\phi} \mathit{IMPL}, \mu \times \mu'$, $0 \models \Box \psi_{equiv}^{ATK}$, which contradicts (4).

D 4WAY-LEAVE VERIFICATION APPROACH

The approach from 4way-LeaVe (used in §6.2) is given in Algorithm 2.